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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Criminal Liability of Corporation-Imputation
of Agents' Knowledge
Defendant trucking corporation was convicted of knowingly and will-
fully keeping false driver's logs in violation of a federal statute. The
evidence indicated wide discrepancies between the false logs and the
trip reports, both of which records were prepared by defendant's driver.1
No single agent of the corporation other than the driver knew of these
discrepancies, but one agent had knowledge of the information in the
logs, and another knew the contents of the trip reports. Although re-
versing the conviction on other grounds, the court of appeals ruled that
the partial information possessed by both agents could be attributed to
the corporation to give it knowledge of the falsity of the logs.2
It was once held that a corporation could not commit a crime,2 but
now corporate bodies can be convicted for acts of misfeasance, 4 violations
of statutes, 5 and crimes involving general and specific criminal intent,6
although some writers have criticized the last extension of criminal re-
sponsibility.7 Because a corporation can act only through its agents or
employees, rules of agency have been used in varying degree to attribute
the nmens rea or guilty knowledge to the corporation in crimes involving
intent.s Generally, a sweeping application of the doctrine of respondeat
1 Whether the driver in falsifying the logs was attempting to further the in-
terests of his employer or to perpetrate a scheme to defraud them was not indi-
cated by the facts or discussed in the opinion.
'Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F. 2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951).
'McDaniel v. Gates City Gas Light Co., 79 Ga. 58, 61 (1887) ; State v. Great
Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41 (1841) ; Anonymous, 12 Mod. 559, 88 Eng.
Rep. 1518 (K. B. 1701).
SE.g., Stewart v. Waterloo Turn Verein, 71 Iowa 226, 32 N. W. 275 (1887);
State v. Western North Carolina R. R., 95 N. C. 602 (1886).
.g., Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 85 N. E. 769 (1908); Commonwealth v.
Sacks, 214 Mass. 72, 100 N. E. 1019 (1913).
'E.g., Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 Fed. 926 (8th Cir. 1914),
aff'd, 236 U. S. 531 (1915) (conspiracy to bring liquor into Indian territory);
Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445 (1899)
(criminal contempt) ; State v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 90 N. J. L. 372, 103 AtI. 695
(1917), aff'd, 94 N. J. L. 171, 111 Atl. 257 (1920) (manslaughter); People v.
Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 248 N. Y. 159, 161 N. E. 455 (1928) (larceny);
State v. Salisbury Ice & Fuel Co., 166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737 (1914) (false pre-
tenses) ; State v. Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 610, 69 S. E. 58 (1910) (willful
destruction of property). See Hildebrand, Corporate Liability for Torts and
Crimes, 13 TEXAs L. REV. 253, 272 (1935).
SBALLENTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs §114 (Rev. ed. 1946); Francis, Criminal Respon-
sibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. REv. 305 (1924) ; Canfield, Corporate Re-
sponsibility for Crime, 14 CoL. L. REv. 469 (1914).
'See New York Central & H. R. R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S. 481 (1909);
Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F. 2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Overland Cotton Mill
Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904) ; State v. Salisbury Ice & Fuel Co.,
166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737 (1914).
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superior has been withheld.9 Courts will impute to the corporation the
knowledge and intent of its officers,10 and, in some cases, that of its
superior agents acting within the scope of their employment ;11 but they
generally do not impute the intent of an ordinary employee unless his
superior had knowledge of such intent 12 or acquiesced in it.13 Lack of
consent is a defense in almost all cases.14
There has been a growing tendency, however, to broaden the area
of corporate criminal liability, and to hold the company for deeds which
were done by any of its agents acting within the scope of their employ-
ment,' 5 especially in cases where the public welfare is involved. 16 It
is said that public necessity requires that the corporation have a non-
delegable duty to prevent violations of the law by its agents. 17 Conse-
8 People v. Jarvis, 135 Cal. App. 288, 27 P. 2d 77 (1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S.
648 (1934); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 153 Mass. 421, 26 N. E. 992 (1891);
People v. Raphael, 190 Misc. 584, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 748 (N. Y. City Ct. 1947). This
restraint on the part of the courts comes from the feeling that "... . it is of the very
essence of our deep-rooted notions of criminal liability that guilt be personal and
individual... ." Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARv.
L. REv. 689, 717 (1930).
"United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F. 2d 16 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Minin-
sohn v. United States, 101 F. 2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939).
1 United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F. 2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948) ; C. I. T. Corp.
v. United States, 150 F. 2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945). "The federal courts seem to em-
phasize the relative position of the agent in the fact pattern without regard to his
rank in the corporate hierarchy." Gallin, Corporate Criminal Liability, 4 LAW
AxD L. N. 3, 5 (fall, 1950).
1 People v. Raphael, 190 Misc. 584, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 748 (N. Y. City Ct. 1947).
The courts, however, will often readily infer such knowledge from the general
circumstances of the case. E.g., Paschen v. United States, 70 F. 2d 491, 503 (7th
Cir. 1934); Zito v. United States, 64 F. 2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933) ; United States v.
Wilson, 59 F. 2d 97 (W. D. Wash. 1932); United States v. Houghton, 14 Fed.
544 (D. N. J. 1882).
13 Grant Bros. Const. Co. v. United States, 13 Ariz. 388, 144 Pac. 955 (1911),
aff'd, 232 U. S. 647 (1913) ; 19 C. J. S. 1075 (1940).
14 Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F. 2d 2 (2d Cir. 1946); John
Gund Brewing Co. v. United States, 204 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1913). But orders
forbidding such acts must have been given in good faith, United States v. Wilson,
59 F. 2d 97 (W. D. Wash. 1932); THOMPSON, LAW OF COPORAnONS §5645 (3d
ed. 1927).
"5 United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F. 2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947);
United States v. George Fish, Inc., 154 F. 2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U. S.
869 (1946); Egan v. United States, 13 F. 2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S.
788 (1943); Regan v. Kroger Groccry and Baking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N. E. 2d
210 (1944); State v. Louisville and N. R. R., 91 Tenn. 445, 19 S. W. 229 (1892) ;
Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 194 Wis. 636, 217 N. W. 412 (1928). This approach is
urged in Edgerton, Corporate Criinawl Responsibility, 36 YALE L. J. 827, 835
(1927.)
18 "Within this field the machinery of criminal administration is utilized as an
enforcing agency because the social interest far outweighs the individual's interest."
Note, 60 HARV. L. Rrv. 283, 285 (1946). See Dotterweich v. United States, 320
U. S. 277 (1943) ; Zito v. United States, 64 F. 2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933) ; Golden
Guernsey Farms, Inc. v. State, 223 Ind. 606, 63 N. E. 2d 699 (1945).
" Actually, the non-delegable duty concept seems to create a type of absolute
liability closely akin to that imposed by the "dangerous instrumentality" rule in
agency cases in the tort field. Compare United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 303
U. S. 239 (1938); United States v. Wilson, 59 F. 2d 97 (W. D. Wash. 1932);
People v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N. Y. 25, 121 N. E. 474 (1918),
[Vol. 30
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quently, companies have been convicted where their agents acted with-
out the knowledge' 8 or, in a few cases, consent' 9 of their superiors, and
even against express orders and instructions. 20 In a few instances it
has been ruled that criminal liability can be imposed even when the
agent has deliberately acted adversely to the interests of the principal.
21
Into this confused area of law, the instant case22 injects a new fiction:
where knowledge is an ingredient of the crime, it can be found by im-
puting the sum total of the bits of information possessed by several
agents to the "mind" of the corporation, and if such information, by
fiction of the law integrated by the "corporate mind," gives notice of the
criminal act of an agent, the corporation has the necessary guilty knowl-
edge.
This theory is completely new to the field of criminal law. It is
unsupported by the language of New York Central & H. R. R. R. v.
United States,23 cited by the court to support the present decision. In
that case, the imputation of partial [italics added] knowledge was never
considered, the court merely holding the defendant railroad responsible
for the knowledge of two of its agents where both agents had complete
knowledge of the crime.
Examples of the use of the "corporate mind" fiction do appear, how-
ever, in some civil cases. In United States v. National Exchange
Bank,2 4 the knowledge of a disbursing clerk as to the amount of a check
drawn by him was imputed to his principal and when the check (which
had been raised afterwards by a third party) was paid by a different
agent, the claim by the principal of payment under a mistake of fact
was denied, the court holding that the drawer and drawee were the
same.25 There have been similar holdings, 26 based upon the legal iden-
with Richman Brothers Co. v. Miller, 131 Ohio St. 424, 3 N. E. 2d 360 (1936)
(tort case)."8 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A. 2d 299 (1941), aff'd,
345 Pa. 456, 28 A. 2d 894 (1942). But see Comment, 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 557
(1947).
"o Regan v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N. E. 2d 210
(1944).
0 United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F. 2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948); Overland
Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904); State Bank v.
Potosi Tie and Lumber Co., 299 Ill. App. 524, 20 N. E. 2d 893 (1939).
2' Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 734 (1945); accord, United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F. 2d
16 (7th Cir. 1949). But see 13 Am. Jtm. §1113 (1938).
-' Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F. 2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951).
-2212 U. S. 481 (1909).
2 270 U. S. 527 (1926).
r1d. at 534.
."Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Madison and Kedzie State Bank, 242 Ill. App.
22 (1926); German-American National Bank v. Kelley, 183 Iowa 269, 166 N. W.
1053 (1918); New England Trust Co. v. Bright, 274 Mass. 407, 17 N. E. 469
(1931); Neal v. Cincinnati Union Stockyards Co., 1 0. C. C. (N. S.) 13 (1903) ;
London County Freehold and Leasehold Properties, Ltd. v. Berkeley Property and
Investment Co., 2 All E. R. 1039 (1936).
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tity of principal and agent,27 but the theory has been sharply criticized
as one which adds innocent knowledge to innocent knowledge to get
guilty knowledge. 28 As a result, most of the courts that espouse this
approach do so with reservations, stating that before it will be imputed,
the information must be obtained by the agent acting within the scope
of his employment,29 that the agent must be involved in the transaction
in connection with which the information is to be imputed, 80 that the
information must appear important to the agent in regard to his 'duties,3 '
or that the agent must have reason to believe the information should be
reported or a duty to report it.32 Some decisions reject the "corporate
mind" fiction entirely, and impute partial knowledge of an agent only
to create estoppel against a principal seeking to obtain the benefits of
a transaction which he has consummated in whole or in part by means
of such agent.
33
The conflict and complications which have been created by the use
of the "corporate mind" approach in civil cases would indicate that its
importation into criminal law is not advisable. If it is deemed bene-
ficial to broaden the criminal liability of corporations, a point of policy
on which there is considerable doubt,8 4 it would appear wiser to achieve
this end by increased application of the "non-delegable" duty &oncept,
with its standard of absolute liability for acts of an agent, than to fol-
low the circuitous route of conjuring up knowledge in the "mind" of
the corporation, when it is clear that in actuality no such knowledge and
no such "mind" exist.
JoHN G. GOLDINrG.
2" For an explanation of the rule and the policies upon which it is based, see
Neal v. Cincinnati Union Stockyards Co., spra note 25.
"Devlin, Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Division of Respoisibility betwectn
Principal and Agent, 53 L. Q. REv. 344, 362 (1937) ; Comment, 15 CAN. B. REV. 716
(1937).
' Solow v. General Motors Truck Co., 64 F. 2d 105 (2d Cir. 1933).
20 Congar v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 24 Wis. 157 (1869).
31 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §275, comment d (1934).
32 Elgin, J. & E. R. R. v. United States, 253 Fed. 907 (7th Cir. 1918).
" Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233 (1877); Irvine v. Grady, 85
Tex. 120, 19 S. W. 1028 (1892).
" Punishment of the corporation itself by fine would not seem to be particu-
larly effective in deterring an employee from committing criminal acts (especially
in cases where the employee is deliberately acting adversely to the interests of his
employer) unless the threat of fine causes the company to exercise stricter control
over its employee. In addition, the reason for a broad application of respondeat
superior in the tort field, i.e., the need to compensate an innocent third party for
his losses, does not exist in the area of criminal responsibility. After all, any
fine levied on the corporation is ultimately passed on to its stockholders in the
form of lower profits or to the public in the form of higher prices. For further
discussion of this point, see BALLANTINE, COaRORAviONS §114 (Rev. ed. 1946);
Edgerton, supra note 15; Francis, supra note 7, at 322; Sayre, supra note 9, at
717.
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